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We examine the extent that product differentiation affects the duration of US import trade
relationships. Applying nonparametric and semiparametric techniques to highly disaggregated
product-level data we estimate that the hazard rate is at least 18 percent higher for homogenous
goods than for differentiated products. Put another way, the median survival time for trade
relationships involving differentiated products is five years as compared to two years for
homogenous products.  
We find that our results are not only highly robust but often are strengthened under alternative
specifications. For instance, if we define trade relationships using industry-level rather than product-
level data we find that the hazard rate is 30-35 percent higher for homogenous goods than for
differentiated products. 
We also find that the survival ranking across product types holds across individual industries.  We
show that dropping the smallest trade relationships further accentuates the differences among
product types. We also control for the possible measurement error in measuring spell lengths and
the role of multiple spell relationships and find that in all cases the differences among products types
are greater than in our benchmark analysis.
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The inﬂuence of the pioneering work of Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985)
has been so profound that nearly all discussions of prominent trade issues such as inter-
and intra-industry trade, the home market eﬀect, and imperfect competition involve the
implicit assumption that trade in homogenous and diﬀerentiated goods is diﬀerent. In fact,
the impact of this work is so great that it is diﬃcult to remember when the diﬀerence
in homogenous and diﬀerentiated goods trade was not one of the self-evident truths of
international economics.
Despite the pre-eminence of this view, or perhaps because of it, there has been little
eﬀort at identifying how and to what extent trade in homogenous and diﬀerentiated goods
really is diﬀerent.1 An exception is the work of Rauch who has spent the better part of the
past decade wrestling with characterizing and understanding how product type inﬂuences
trade. Much of Rauch’s work emphasizes the fact that most homogenous goods, but few
diﬀerentiated goods, are traded on organized exchanges. This insight underlies Rauch’s
view that the network/search theory is important for understanding trade in diﬀerentiated
products (Rauch, 1996, 2001; Casella and Rauch, 2003; Rauch and Trindade, 2002).
In this paper we ask a more basic question; namely, can we empirically document that
trade in homogenous goods diﬀers from trade in diﬀerentiated products? Although this
question is straightforward it has largely been ignored in the literature. The work closest to
ours is Rauch (1999) who uses a gravity equation framework to show that network/search
measures are more important for trade in diﬀerentiated products than for homogenous
products.
We take an entirely new approach to the issue. We examine whether being diﬀerent has
any impact on duration of trading relationships. In previous work we have shown that trade
relationships are generally very short-lived (Besedeˇ s and Prusa, 2003); in this paper we ﬁnd
that exactly how short depends signiﬁcantly on the extent of product diﬀerentiation. We
ﬁnd that at each point in time the survival function for diﬀerentiated products is above
the survival function for homogenous products. Moreover, the diﬀerences are economically
large. Half of all relationships involving homogenous goods survive only one or two years;
by contrast, the median survival time for diﬀerentiated products is ﬁve years.
Intuitively, one would expect that trade relationships involving homogenous products
might be quite fragile. For products such as corn, wheat, and oil one can imagine a “world
market” where all foreign suppliers ship and all buyers purchase their products. In this case,
trade relationships might be very short; relationship-speciﬁc factors may not matter and
source country may be irrelevant. By contrast, the seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
1There are a number of papers that indirectly discuss the importance of product type but they are
mainly interested in other issues (Helpman, 1987; Hummels and Levinsohn, 1995; Evenett and Keller, 2002;
Debaere, 2003). More recently, Dalgin, Mitra and Trindade (2003) examine if product type helps explain
inequality and trade.
1and Helpman and Krugman (1985) suggests that each variety of diﬀerentiated products
should be desired by consumers; hence trade relationships for diﬀerentiated goods might
be very long-lived (i.e., source country matters). More generally, diﬀerentiated products
are likely to involve relationship-speciﬁc investments and as a result one might expect far
longer lived relationships.
Using Rauch’s (1999) classiﬁcation scheme we are able to characterize how product type
aﬀects duration and our empirical ﬁndings provide strong support for the view that trade in
diﬀerentiated and homogenous goods does diﬀer.2 Speciﬁcally, Rauch’s scheme allows us to
classify products into one of three types—diﬀerentiated, reference priced, and homogenous.
We ﬁnd that diﬀerentiated products tend to have the longest survival, followed by reference
priced products and then homogenous products. Simply put, the ordering of product types
that we ﬁnd is completely consistent with the implicit assumption made in many standard
theoretical models of trade.
Moreover, we show that these results are highly robust to a large number of alterations
to our benchmark data. For instance, we show that the ﬁndings are not driven by the
highly disaggregated nature of our data. We ﬁnd that as we aggregate from product-
level data to industry-level data the estimated diﬀerences in survival among product types
increase. When using product-level trade data we ﬁnd that as compared with diﬀerentiated
products the hazard rate for reference priced goods is 16 percent higher and for homogenous
goods 18 percent higher. In comparison, when using industry-level trade data we ﬁnd
that as compared with diﬀerentiated products the hazard rate for reference priced goods
is 24 percent higher and for homogenous goods 32 percent higher. The industry-level
results are a striking conﬁrmation of our product-level results and are remarkably reassuring
given the potential for misclassiﬁcation that exists in a product-level trade dataset that is
constructed from literally millions of U.S. Customs declaration forms.
Another potential concern is that our results are driven by diﬀerences in the value of
trade across product types. Speciﬁcally, it seems reasonable to expect that trade relation-
ships with large values of trade to be longer lived, perhaps reﬂecting the beach-head eﬀect
discussed in Baldwin (1988). For instance, all else equal, one might expect relationships
with $1 million of trade will survive longer than relationships with $100,000 of trade, which
in turn will survive longer than relationships with $1,000 of trade. As it turns out, rela-
tionships with large trade values do indeed have longer duration. This raises the intriguing
possibility that our estimated product type diﬀerences are simply reﬂecting size diﬀerences
rather than really telling us something about the impact of product type. It turns out,
however, this fear is unfounded. In fact, rather than weakening our results, we ﬁnd that
controlling for size increases the role of product type. That is, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly greater
diﬀerences among product types when we drop the smallest trade relationships. For in-
2We are agnostic about what precise theory(ies) explains the diﬀerence. In the appendix we brieﬂy sketch
how both “address” and “nonaddress” models can underlie the diﬀerence in duration. We also found Rauch’s
network/search models quite compelling.
2stance, if we limit our analysis to those relationships whose trade value in the ﬁrst year is
greater than $100,000 ($1,000,000) we ﬁnd that the hazard rate for reference priced goods is
50 percent (150 percent) higher and for homogenous goods 62 percent (180 percent) higher
than for diﬀerentiated goods. In other words, size does matter and it serves to intensify,
not diminish, the importance of product type.
We also examine the extent that our results are inﬂuenced by possible incorrect infer-
ences about the end of trade relationships. Our concern is that some relationships experience
multiple spells of service and if the time between these spells is short, it is possible that the
gap of non-service is mis-measured and hence that the duration is mis-measured. If this is
the case, for instance, two short spells (separated by a gap) might really be one longer spell.
We consider several alternative methods of controlling for this potential measurement error
and ﬁnd little impact of these adjustments: large and signiﬁcant diﬀerences among product
types remain a key feature of the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data set used
in our study. Section 3 describes the econometric models used in our empirical analysis and
section 4 presents the basic empirical results. In section 5 we verify the robustness of our
ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
2D a t a
Our analysis is based on US import statistics as compiled by Feenstra (1996).3 From 1972
through 1988 import products were classiﬁed according to the seven digit Tariﬀ Schedule
of the United States (TS).4 Since 1989 imports have been classiﬁed according to the ten
digit Harmonized System (HS). Given that all products were recoded in 1989, we limit
our analysis to the period 1972-1988 in order to avoid potential concordance issues.5 In
simplest terms, for each commodity and year we can identify all of the countries from
whom the United States purchased. Over the entire period there is a total of about 22,000
diﬀerent products in the TS data. On average, in each year we observe import trade for
about 10,000 products sourced from about 160 countries.
We are interested in studying the length of time until a country no longer exports a
product to the US, an event that we will refer to as a “failure.” As a result calendar time
is not as important as analysis time, which measures the length or duration that a country
exports a product to the US. Hence, for each product and country we use the annual data to
create spell data. By this we mean that if we observe trade in product i from country c from
3Details on the sources of our data are included in the appendix.
4We only study imports because there is no concordance between the disaggregated TS import and export
codes. In addition, the export data is self-reported making it more likely that exports are misreported.
5When the TS codes were replaced with the HS codes multiple TS products were mapped into single HS
codes and vice versa; this makes it impossible to discern actual exits during 1988–89. See Schott (2001) for
more discussion of the TS-HS concordance problem.
31976–1980, we would say that the cith trade relationship has a spell length of ﬁve. Thinking
of imports in terms of spells our dataset has 693,963 observations. The observations have
a median (mean) spell length of 4 (2.7) years.
Our benchmark analysis is based on the most disaggregated data available, the 7-digit
TS data, which means our analysis is at the product-level, not the industry-level. Inferences
are based on trade in tangible products rather than aggregate summaries. Until relatively
recently such disaggregated data were not widely available and empirical studies were based
on industry classiﬁcations, such as the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC).
We chose to base our benchmark results on the 7-digit TS data primarily because it does
the best job of measuring trade in products rather than industries. For instance, the TS
data reports information on more than 30 diﬀerent types of ball bearings, diﬀerentiating by
specialized application (e.g., automobiles), size, and chemistry. By contrast, if we were to
perform our analysis using SITC classiﬁcations (as we do later in our robustness checks) we
would aggregate all of these ball bearing codes along with other similar, or perhaps not so
similar, products to create spells of service. In fact, the dozens of ball bearing codes map into
a single SITC category “all, roller or needle roller bearings” (4 digit code=7491) combining
ball bearings with roller and needle roller bearings. Further aggregation is possible, to “Non-
electric machinery parts” (3 digit code=749) or “Industrial machinery” (2 digit code=74),
but doing so makes it increasingly diﬃcult to interpret the results since each classiﬁcation
includes highly disparate products.
For duration analysis we believe that using highly disaggregated data is crucial. First
of all, we need the data to be suﬃciently disaggregated to allow us to identify the extent of
product diﬀerentiation. The more aggregated is the data, the more we will be identifying
industries rather than products and many diﬀerent types of products can be sold by a single
industry.6 Hence, industry-level analysis may make it more diﬃcult to identify the role of
product types.
In addition, if the products are too broadly deﬁned, we cannot expect to see any source
countries exit the data. If we aggregate all imports from each country, at the extreme,
we will never observe any exit since the United States purchases some product from each
source country every year.
Further, once we began to think of trade data in terms of spells it became apparent that
we needed to account for censoring in our analysis. By this we mean that we often do not
know whether a trade relationship ended because of failure or for some other reason. In
practice this means that we do not know for certain the beginning or ending date for some
trade relationships.7 As it turns out, censoring is pretty common in US import data—about
6For instance, at the 1-digit SITC level, only two of the ten industries are composed of a single product
type.
7There are a number of important issues (including the aggregation issue) involved in applying duration
analysis to import data. Most of the issues are not central to the primary focus in this paper (the impact of
product diﬀerentiation). Besedeˇ s and Prusa (2003) contains an extensive discussion of the import data and
4half of the trade observations are censored and about 20 percent of spells are censored at
one year. The censoring problem comes in two ﬂavors. First, we have no information on
trade relationships for the years before the beginning (pre-1972) and after the end of our
sample (post-1988). For example, we observe that the US imported corn (TS=1312000)
from the Philippines in 1972 and that this relationship was observed for exactly one year.
This trade relationship may have begun in 1972 or it may have begun in some prior year.
The most appropriate interpretation is that this relationship had a duration of at least
one year. Similarly, we also observe that the US imported corn from Peru from 1984 to
1988. Unfortunately, our data does not continue beyond 1988 and hence we cannot be sure
how long that spell ultimately lasted. Once again, the most appropriate interpretation is
that this relationship had a duration of at least ﬁve years. About 10 percent of spells are
observed in 1972, while about 22 percent are observed in 1988.8 This ﬁrst type of censoring
is typical in survival studies and is accounted for in all of our subsequent analysis.
The second type of censoring is somewhat unique and stems from the fact that our
analysis is performed at the product-level. US Customs revises product deﬁnitions for the
tariﬀ codes on an ongoing basis, sometimes splitting a single code into multiple codes and
other times combining multiple codes into fewer codes. Unfortunately, information does
not exist to allow us to map the old TS codes into the new ones. When a code is changed
we no longer observe trade in the old product code. But, is this due to the end of a
relationship or does it simply mean that trade stopped due to the redeﬁnition? We choose
to be cautious and classify all such “exits” as censored, which means that we interpret
reclassiﬁed relationships as having duration of at least x years (where x is the number of
years where trade in the original code was observed). An analogous problem exists for
the new codes. When a code is changed we begin to observe trade in the new product
code(s). But, is this really the beginning of a new relationship or does it simply reﬂect the
redeﬁnition? Once again for much of our analysis we choose to be cautious and assume
the relationship had a duration of at least y years (where y is the number of years where
trade in the new code was observed). About 20 percent of the spells are censored due to
reclassiﬁcation.
This second type of censoring is a peculiar characteristic of our benchmark data. It can
be argued that our decision to interpret all product code changes as being censored is overly
conservative—one could alternatively classify these product code changes as indicating entry
and exit. We believe this alternative classiﬁcation scheme will undoubtedly understate the
true duration and this view is conﬁrmed in Besedeˇ s and Prusa (2003). Thus, we do not
pursue this alternative approach and instead present results based on deﬁning relationships
using the 5-digit SITC industry-level classiﬁcation. While the size of our database falls
dramatically, we are still left with over 157,000 observations of spells of service. Since
its applicability to duration analysis.
8Less than two percent of all spells span the entire 1972 through 1988 period.
5the SITC classiﬁcation system is unchanged throughout our sample, industry-level analysis
is not plagued by the second type of censoring and, hence, is not subject to errors due to
reclassiﬁcation. As a result only the ﬁrst type of censoring (which is driven by the beginning
and the end of our sample) is present in the SITC analysis. In addition, the SITC level
analysis serves to verify whether our results are robust to aggregation since there may be
some concern that the 7-digit data is too disaggregated.9
Our next major task involved characterizing the extent of product diﬀerentiation for
each product. We follow Rauch (1999) and classify commodities into three categories:
homogenous, reference priced, and diﬀerentiated. Rauch classiﬁed products that are traded
on an organized exchange as homogenous goods. Products not sold on exchanges but whose
benchmark prices exist were classiﬁed as reference priced; all other products were deemed
diﬀerentiated products.
Although coarser than one would like, Rauch’s classiﬁcation scheme has several virtues.
First and foremost, it is the only classiﬁcation scheme that we know of that exists at a
highly disaggregated level. Rauch classiﬁes products at the 4-digit SITC level and we
mapped his codes to the 7-digit TS codes using the concordance found in Feenstra (1996).
In a ﬁrst best world, we would know each product’s elasticity of substitution. Unfortunately,
such elasticities are generally only available for 2-digit industries and perhaps a handful of
3-digit industries. Given the requirement that we use highly disaggregated data in our
analysis, Rauch’s scheme is preferred. Moreover, seven of the ten SITC industries are
represented by products from each of the three product types, which conﬁrms that Rauch’s
scheme is fairly rich and is not simply a re-mapping of industry codes. Second, Rauch’s
scheme makes intuitive sense since it broadly captures what economists mean by product
substitutability. Products that are sold on organized exchanges (like corn, oil, wheat, etc.)
are exactly those products typically cited as being homogenous. Consumers may neither
know nor care about the source of the product that they are purchasing. On the other
hand, products like many types of steel and chemicals whose prices are listed in industry
guides and trade journals will likely have some unique attributes (e.g., quality may vary
by source country) but are essentially substitutable. In this case, consumers will know
the source country, but this may only have a small impact on their purchasing decision.
In the ﬁnal category are diﬀerentiated products. These are products that not only have
many characteristics that vary across suppliers but may even be speciﬁcally tailored to the
end-user’s needs. Automobiles are perhaps the most often cited example of such a good;
in fact, most consumer goods (e.g., toys, apparel, cookware) are classiﬁed as diﬀerentiated.
Third, Rauch’s classiﬁcation scheme is quite comprehensive, covering about 98 percent of
all US import relationships. There is no selection bias as might be the case if we limited
our analysis to only those products where substitution elasticities exist.
9It can be argued that parsing the data too ﬁnely leads to excessive exits as modest changes in a product’s
speciﬁcations or minor mistakes made by Custom’s oﬃcials can result in the product being assigned to a
diﬀerent TS code. SITC level analysis will be far less prone to such errors.
63 Empirical Approach
Since we are interested in investigating how likely a country is to cease exporting a product
to the United States, it is only natural that we approach this issuse by using duration
analysis methods. We ﬁrst estimate survival functions across product types by using the
nonparametric Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator, and then proceed to model the hazard
of US import trade with the Cox proportional hazard model. The goal of this exercise is
to investigate whether diﬀerences across product types are robust once we include factors
that we think aﬀect the duration of trade.
3.1 Nonparametric Estimation
The survivor function S(t) is usually estimated nonparametrically using the Kaplan-Meier
product limit estimator. Derivation is as follows. Assume a sample contains n independent
observations denoted (ti;ci), i =1 ,2,...,n, where ti is the survival time, while ci is the
censoring indicator variable C (taking on a value of 1 if failure occurred, 0 otherwise) of
observation i. Assume there are m<nrecorded times of failure. Denote the rank-ordered
survival times as t(1) <t (2) < ···<t (m). Let nj denote the number of subjects at risk
of failing at t(j)a n dl e tdj denote the number of observed failures. The Kaplan-Meier







with the convention that ˆ S(t)=1i ft<t (1). Given that many of our observations
are censored, we note that the Kaplan-Meier estimator is robust to censoring and uses
information from both censored and non-censored observations.






The Cox proportional hazard regression model asserts that the hazard rate is
h(t,x,β)=h0(t)exp(xβ),
where x denotes a vector of explanatory variables and the βs are to be estimated. The base-
line hazard, h0(t) characterizes how the hazard function changes as a function of time. The
baseline hazard captures individual heterogeneity that is not explained by the covariates.
7In the Cox proportional hazard model one subject’s hazard is a multiplicative replica of








One particular application of this property is to compare one subject with covariates
{x1,x 2,...,x k} with another with the same covariates, except that x2 is incremented by 1.
Taking the ratio of the hazards of these two subjects, we have
h(t,x1,x 2 +1 ,...,x k,β)/h(t,x1,x 2,...,x k,β) = exp(β2).
Note that this ratio is not a function of t. Hence, exponentiated individual coeﬃcients have
the interpretation of the ratio of the hazards for a one-unit change in the corresponding
covariate. A particular advantage of the Cox model is that the baseline hazard is left
unspeciﬁed and is not estimated. This allows us to account for unobserved heterogeneity in
a more tractable approach than the Kaplan-Meier estimator and a less restrictive approach
than a fully parametric model.
4 Empirical Findings — Benchmark 7-digit TS Data
4.1 Nonparametric Results
We begin by performing some nonparametric estimates using the benchmark 7-digit TS
data. The Kaplan-Meier survival function, ˆ S(t), is graphed in the upper-left panel of
Figure 1 for each of the three product types. Survival functions across product types
are similar in that each is downward sloping with a decreasing slope. This indicates that
regardless of the product type trade relationships face a large probability of failure in their
ﬁrst few years. As discussed in Besedeˇ s and Prusa (2003), the risk declines quite markedly
once trade relationships last for 4-5 years. In fact, we ﬁnd the conditional probability of
failing in the ﬁrst year to be remarkably high, 45 percent for homogenous goods, 41 percent
for reference priced goods, and 31 percent for diﬀerentiated goods. However, by year 5, the
conditional probability of failing for each type has fallen to less than seven percent; after
10 years, the hazard rate for each type has fallen to less than two percent.
In terms of the main research issue in this paper the diﬀerences in the survival functions
across product types are notable. At each point the survival function for diﬀerentiated
products is above the survival function for reference priced products, which in turn is
above the survival function for homogenous products. Moreover, given the large number
of observations in our sample, the diﬀerences between the Kaplan-Meier survivor functions
are statistically signiﬁcant.10
10The standard errors are in the range 0.001 to 0.02.
8Our ﬁndings indicate that diﬀerentiated products have the longest survival, followed by
reference priced products, and then homogenous products. Diﬀerentiated products have a
median survival time of ﬁve years; reference priced goods and homogenous products have a
median survival time of only two years. Put another way, this means that after controlling
for censoring half of the trade relationships involving homogenous goods fail during the ﬁrst
two years. This is an extraordinarily short life expectancy. Not surprisingly, the chance
of observing a spell of more than 10 years is far greater for diﬀerentiated products (45%)
than for either reference priced goods (32%) or for homogenous products (25%). Given the
extraordinary failure rates during the ﬁrst few years it is impressive that we nevertheless
ﬁnd that such a high percentage of goods survive for more than 10 years. The explanation is
not that there are few exits; rather, most exits that are observed in later years are classiﬁed
as censored as opposed to failures, resulting in low hazard rates in those periods.
4.2 Semiparametric Results
Table 1 contains the Cox proportional hazard estimates using our benchmark data. Our
basic estimation model includes the standard regressors that appear in the gravity equation
literature (e.g., GDP, language, continuity, distance). While we do not oﬀer a theoretical
model of how these variables aﬀect survival, we believe it is reasonable to include the gravity
equation variables in our empirical model. The gravity equation states that the bilateral
trade between two countries is directly proportional to the product of the countries’ GDPs
and therefore larger countries will tend to trade more with each other. Given the gravity
equation’s remarkable job of predicting bilateral trade, we view the gravity-motivated re-
gressors as an exogenous control for the propensity for source countries to supply the US
market.
In addition, we include several variables to capture relative cost and competitiveness
issues. We use the industry-level tariﬀ rate to control for the ease with which foreign ﬁrms
can enter the market. Whether higher tariﬀs increase or decrease the hazard depends largely
on whether time series or cross-section variation dominates. For a given product, an increase
in the tariﬀ should lead to some foreign ﬁrms exiting because higher tariﬀs raise the costs
of servicing the US market. It follows that time series variation in tariﬀs should lead us
to ﬁnd that higher tariﬀs raise the hazard. On the other hand, looking across industries
higher tariﬀs mean less competition for those ﬁrms currently in the market. As a result
both domestic and foreign ﬁrms servicing the US market face less risk and hence a lower
hazard. It follows that cross section variation in tariﬀs should lead us to ﬁnd that higher
tariﬀs lower the hazard. Given that there is relatively little time series variation in tariﬀs,
we expect the cross section eﬀect to dominate which means that higher tariﬀs should lower
the hazard.
In order to capture the impact of cost changes on the hazard we included the change
in the relative real exchange rate. To construct this measure of relative costs, we began by
9deﬁning each country’s exchange rate so that an increase corresponds to a real depreciation
(i.e., foreign currency per US dollar). Then in each year we normalized the exchange rate
by the average percentage change of all supplying countries’ exchange rates. This gives
us a measure of how each country’s exchange rate changed relative to its competitors. An
increase in this measure reﬂects that a country’s currency has weakened relatively more than
its competitors. If one country’s currency depreciates relative to other countries’ currencies,
its ﬁrms should become more competitive vis-` a-vis other foreign and domestic ﬁrms and
hence less likely to exit.
Schott (2001) argues that even with data as disaggregated as the 7-digit TS import
data, some products are more broadly deﬁned than one would like. In order to control
for diversity of the products we calculate the coeﬃcient of variation of unit values for each
TS product in each year. We expect that the smaller the coeﬃcient of variation the more
homogenous is the product and hence the greater the hazard.
Schott’s work also persuaded us to include the relative unit value in our regression. This
index is calculated by normalizing each supplier’s unit value by the average unit value for
that product. Thus, a value of one means the supplier’s unit value is the mean price; values
greater (smaller) than one mean the supplier charges a higher (lower) price.
We were also concerned that a supplier’s market presence may inﬂuence the duration.
Speciﬁcally, we were concerned that for any given product the bigger the supplier the less
likely the exit from the market. Simply controlling for size, however, is insuﬃcient as the
meaning of “big” varies dramatically across product codes. Therefore, in order to control
for product heterogeneity we calculated market share for each country supplying a given
product.
Finally, there is the issue of multiple spells—trade relationships that have multiple pe-
riods of service separated by a period with no service. Speciﬁcally, some trade relationships
are observed for a period of consecutive years (spell 1), then are followed by a period of
no trade, and then again observed for another service spell (spell 2).11 We believe that
the ﬁrst failure makes a second failure more likely (higher hazard). On the other hand,
it is also possible that the return of the foreign supplier to the market is a positive sign
making a second failure less likely. In either case the hazard rate will depend on whether
we are observing a second spell and should be controlled for in our estimation. In our base
speciﬁcations we treat multiple spells as independent. That is, we include spells after the
ﬁrst and use a dummy to control for any impact of higher order spells. We will consider
alternative methods for addressing multiple spells in the following section.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 1 we report our benchmark estimates based on the entire
sample. Throughout we present results in terms of hazard ratios. Hence, an estimated
hazard rate coeﬃcient less than (greater than) (equal to) 1 is interpreted as implying that
11About one-quarter of trade relationships experience multiple spells of service and about two-thirds of
those experience just two spells. Less than one percent of trade relationships have more than three spells.
10the variable lowers (raises) (has no impact on) the risk of failure. All reported estimates
include region dummies.12
In many respects the estimates are consistent with those in the gravity literature. The
estimated eﬀects for the standard gravity variables, however, are generally small. In par-
ticular, our estimates imply that:
• Distance increases the hazard rate, but by a fairly small magnitude, and in some
speciﬁcations is statistically insigniﬁcant. With few exceptions (e.g., Australia) the
diﬀerences in distance between the US and its trading partners would only lead to
about a 1 percent diﬀerence in hazard rates.
• Common language lowers the hazard, but again the eﬀect is fairly small, about 5 per-
cent. On the other hand, countries that are contiguous with the US (Canada and
Mexico) face signiﬁcantly lower hazard rates—on the order of 30 percent.
• Larger countries (as measured by GDP) face a lower hazard. Given the variance in
country GDP, the size of the eﬀect depends signiﬁcantly on country size. Thinking
either in terms of diﬀerences across time or countries the estimates imply that a $100
billion increase in GDP lowers the hazard rate by about 2 percent; a $1 trillion increase
in GDP lowers the hazard rate by about 20 percent.
• Industries with higher tariﬀs face a lower hazard. A 1 percentage point increase in an
industry’s tariﬀ lowers the hazard by approximately 2 percent.
We also ﬁnd that changes in the relative real exchange rate have a large impact on the
hazard rate. We ﬁnd that a 10 percent depreciation in the real exchange rate (relative to
other suppliers) lowers the hazard by about 10 percent. As a country’s currency becomes
cheaper, its products become more competitive.
We also ﬁnd that products with higher variation in unit values face a signiﬁcantly lower
hazard rate. At ﬁrst blush this might seem surprising since it suggests that high and low
prices for the same product increase duration. However, the result conﬁrms Schott’s (2001)
contention that one must be cautious in interpreting even extremely disaggregated TS
product codes as identifying an identical product. Rather, it appears that a single code
code can capture diﬀerentiated products. For instance, the “cotton T-shirt” product might
include commodity grade products from China and Bangladesh and also fashion designer
products from Italy. Our results suggest that high variation in unit values indicates that
the product code contains products with diﬀerentiated characteristics.
12We estimated with and without region dummies and found with few exceptions that the results do not
vary signiﬁcantly across speciﬁcations. We also estimated with country dummies which greatly increased
computation time without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the results.
11The next two regressors, relative unit values and product market share, have a small
impact on duration. A product priced 20 percent higher than the mean will only have about
a one percent higher hazard. Albeit a small eﬀect, the result is consistent with Schott’s
conjecture discussed above. A supplier’s market presence as captured by product market
share lowers the hazard, but only by an economically insigniﬁcant amount.
We are primarily interested in the product type estimates. Letting diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts be the benchmark, we ﬁnd that reference priced goods have a 16 percent higher hazard
and homogenous goods an 18 percent higher hazard. Thus, the estimates strongly support
what Figure 1 suggested: namely, product type matters.
In Table 2 we report the results when we consider a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation where we
allow the coeﬃcients on all variables to vary by product type. By in large, the estimates
conﬁrm what we learned from the basic speciﬁcation. Namely, Canada/Mexico, larger
countries, high tariﬀ products, and weaker currencies, all have lower hazard rates. We
also ﬁnd that higher variation in unit values lowers the hazard for diﬀerentiated products,
but increases it for homogeneous goods. This is what standard economic theory would
predict. In particular, in a homogenous product market one would be surprised if high
priced suppliers would be likely to have long lived spells of service; on the other hand, in a
diﬀerentiated product market, high priced suppliers could easily have a long service spell if
their high prices reﬂect quality diﬀerences.
Most importantly, even after allowing for systematic diﬀerences across product types,
we continue to ﬁnd that homogenous products face a signiﬁcantly higher hazard than dif-
ferentiated products, on the order of 10 percent. Reference priced goods, however, are not
estimated to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than diﬀerentiated goods.
5 Robustness
We next perform several exercises to investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings. There are
ﬁve concerns we explore. First, are the same patterns found in industry-level data? Second,
are our results driven by diﬀerences in the value of trade across product types? Third,
are our results aﬀected by a potential measurement error regarding the end of the spell?
Fourth, does the fact that we do not observe trade relationships prior to 1972 inﬂuence the
results? Fifth, are the diﬀerences across product types driven by the distribution of product
types across industries?
5.1 Industry-level analysis
As discussed above we can also deﬁne trade relationships using industry-level data. In
addition to mitigating the censoring problem, industry-level analysis allows us to explore
whether the diﬀerences across product types are due to the highly disaggregated nature of
our data. Our concern is that the TS classiﬁcation system is too ﬁne—perhaps 30 diﬀerent
12ball-bearing codes represents an overly ﬁne parsing of the data and leads us to observe
excessive entry and exit. If so, trade relationships might be better measured using the
SITC industry classiﬁcation.
To investigate this concern we calculated spells of service using the 5- and 4-digit SITC
industry data. We plot the Kaplan-Meier survival function for each of the three product
types in Figure 2 for the 5-digit SITC data (upper-left).13 As with our benchmark data
at each time the survival function for diﬀerentiated products is above the survival function
for reference priced products, which in turn is above the survival function for homogenous
products. The graphs suggest that the diﬀerences among the product types are somewhat
attenuated as compared to the benchmark data. For instance, the median survival time
for all three product types is just two years. Nevertheless, the diﬀerences persist and are
statistically signiﬁcant.
In Table 3 we report the Cox proportional hazard estimates. We note that not all of the
variables are available when we analyze the data at the SITC level. For instance, because
units vary by product industry-level unit values cannot be calculated. Interestingly, the
results indicate that once we control for other factors, the diﬀerences among product types
are greater than in our benchmark data. Looking at the 5-digit SITC results (column two)
we see that the ordering of the products is the same as in our benchmark data, but the
magnitudes are larger. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that as compared with diﬀerentiated products
the hazard rate for reference priced goods is 24 percent higher and for homogenous goods
32 percent higher when we use the 5-digit SITC data.
Results for the 4-digit SITC data are similar (column three of Table 3). In particular,
the Kaplan-Meier ranking of survival functions is exactly the same as for the 7-digit TS and
the 5-digit SITC data. As was the case with the 5-digit data the diﬀerences among product
types are greater than in our benchmark data.
In Table 4 we report the results when we consider the more ﬂexible speciﬁcation where
the coeﬃcients on all variables vary by product type. The results are a bit stronger than
what we saw in our benchmark runs. In particular, homogenous products face a signiﬁcantly
higher hazard than diﬀerentiated products. Reference priced goods have a higher hazard
than diﬀerentiated goods but lower than homogenous goods (i.e., the same ordering as we
saw in our benchmark runs).
All in all, we view the industry-level analysis as conﬁrming our main ﬁndings: (i) dif-
ferentiated goods have a signiﬁcantly lower hazard rate than reference price goods which
in turn have a signiﬁcantly lower hazard than homogenous products; and (ii) the diﬀerence
in hazard rates between diﬀerentiated and reference priced goods is smaller than between
diﬀerentiated and homogenous goods.
13The Kaplan-Meier plots are similar for the 4-digit data.
135.2 Does size matter?
The inclusion of market share in our speciﬁcation controls for the size within each given
product market. Our concern here is that our results are driven by diﬀerences in the value
of trade across product markets. It seems reasonable to expect that spells with large values
of trade will be longer lived. For instance, all else equal, one might expect a relationship
with $1 million of trade in the ﬁrst year of the spell to survive longer than an observation
with $100,000 of trade in the initial year.14 If so, the ﬁndings reported above might reﬂect
that (i) small valued spells are at greatest risk and (ii) homogenous goods tend to involve
small value spells. In other words, the estimates may merely be capturing diﬀerences in
traded value rather than telling us something about the importance of product type.
Let us look at the support for each hypothesis separately. First, are small valued spells
at greatest risk? To address this we graph the distribution of spell lengths in Figure 3 using
the benchmark 7-digit TS data. On the x-axis we graph the duration of the spell. We begin
by plotting data on all trade observations; this benchmark distribution reﬂects all trade
spells and should be interpreted as an equally weighted distribution as each observation is
treated symmetrically (plotted with a solid line). As shown, more than 50 percent of the
observations are observed for only one year. More than 70 percent of all spells are observed
for less than three years. Overall, fewer than ﬁve percent of all trade spells last more than
ten years.
One method to get a sense of whether value matters is to weigh each observation by
the value of trade in the ﬁrst year of the spell. By doing so an observation with $1 million
of trade has 10 times the impact of an observation with $100,000 of trade. This weighted
distribution is plotted with a dashed line in Figure 3. As one can see this measure indicates
that larger dollar relationships are indeed longer lived. Weighed by value, 12.4 percent of
spells are observed for only one year; 29.9 percent are observed for less than three years—
signiﬁcantly less than the 70 percent attrition that we found in the unweighted sample.
Looking at those spells that last more than ten years, long lived spells are about ﬁve times
more likely when we weigh spells by value than when we equally weigh the observations.
It strikes us, however, that weighing the observations by value overstates the role played
by the largest trade observations. Given that we want to think about duration of trade
relationships we believe that it is an overstatement to say that a $1 billion crude oil purchase
is 1000 times more important than a $1 million auto parts purchase. We believe that
weighing by trade value focuses too much on the biggest observations.
We feel a better way to get at the issue is to equally weigh the observations but ﬁlter
out small dollar-value observations. In other words, eliminate spells whose trade in the ﬁrst
year is below some minimum level. This allows us to identify the role played by small value
observations without overly focusing on the biggest observations. In Figure 3 we plot the
distributions using this ﬁltering scheme. We depict two alternative cut-oﬀ levels for year
14We use the CPI to convert the nominal trade values into real 1987 dollars.
14one trade, $100,000 and $1 million, but our results are not sensitive to the precise cut-oﬀ
level used. As seen, imposing higher cut-oﬀs results in higher distributions. This provides
further evidence that the small valued trade relationships are at greatest risk.
Let us now look at the support for the second hypothesis. Do homogenous goods tend to
involve small value spells? If so, it is possible that the diﬀerences in the survival functions
depicted in Figure 1 only reﬂect size. If size were all that mattered, we should ﬁnd that
diﬀerentiated goods tend to involve larger trade values. Yet, the opposite is the case:
diﬀerentiated goods tend to involve the smallest trade values. On average in the ﬁrst
year of the spell homogenous products involve larger value transactions ($4.5 million) than
reference priced ($730,000) or diﬀerentiated goods ($700,000).15
This discussion suggests that rather than weakening our results controlling for size may
strengthen our results. That is, if size matters (and it appears that it does) the observed
trade values suggest that product type is even more important than our benchmark results
suggest. Given this background discussion we plot the Kaplan-Meier survival function for
each of the three product types after dropping the small-valued observations (Figures 1
and 2 for the 7-digit TS and the 5-digit SITC data, respectively). In the upper-right (lower-
left) panel the results are based on dropping all observations where the value of ﬁrst year of
the spell was less that $100,000 ($1,000,000). Two important insights are gained. First, as
Figure 3 suggested, the survivor functions shift up as we progressively drop observations.
This means that small spells tend to be shorter-lived. Second—and most relevant for our
discussion—the estimates provide no evidence that diﬀerences among the product types
are driven by small observations. In fact, the diﬀerences among product types grow as we
progressively eliminate the smaller trade observations.
In order to get a numerical assessment of the impact, we re-estimate the Cox proportional
hazard model using the two cutoﬀs for the value of trade in the initial year of the spell. The
estimates are reported in columns two and three of Table 1. Comparing these estimates
with the benchmark (column one), we ﬁnd that the impact of common language, contiguity
and tariﬀ rates all increase. The impact of distance increases at the $100,000 cut-oﬀ level,
but at the $1,000,000 cut-oﬀ level the estimate is statistically insigniﬁcant. The impact of
GDP and variation of unit values increases at both cut-oﬀs, but the impact at the $100,000
cut-oﬀ is greater than that at the $1,000,000 level. Interestingly, the impact of the change
in exchange rate declines as we restrict ourselves to the bigger spells. By contrast, the
impact of relative unit values and market presence are largely unchanged as we ﬁlter out
the smaller observations.
Most importantly, product type dummies indicate that the results are not driven by
small value spells. Compared to diﬀerentiated goods, homogeneous goods face a 62 percent
higher hazard rate at the $100,000 cut-oﬀ level, and a 184 percent higher hazard rate at the
15If we compare the average value over the entire spell we ﬁnd the same ordering. In addition, we also
compare trade values for groupings of countries such as OECD, non-OECD. No matter the grouping we
always ﬁnd that diﬀerentiated products involve far smaller trade values than homogenous goods.
15$1,000,000 cut-oﬀ level. Reference priced products face 50-150 percent higher hazard rates
as we restrict our sample to larger trade value observations.
When we look at the more ﬂexible speciﬁcation (Table 2) we continue to see that re-
stricting our analysis to high value spells accentuates the diﬀerences among the types. For
instance, if we include all observations, diﬀerentiated and reference priced goods are found to
have similar hazard rates. If, however, we restrict ourselves to relationships with $1,000,000
of trade (in the ﬁrst year), reference price goods have an 88% higher hazard. Homogenous
goods have a 130% higher hazard.
The bottom-line is that size does matter. But, perhaps surprisingly, we ﬁnd that in
terms of duration size magniﬁes the impact of product type.
5.3 Measurement error
We now examine how our results are aﬀected if we incorrectly infer that a trade relationship
ended. In particular, our concern involves trade relationships with multiple spells. If the
time between spells is short (what we will refer to as the gap), it is possible that the gap
is mis-measured and that interpreting the initial spell as “failing” is inappropriate. In this
case, the two spells might be better thought of as one longer spell. And, if this measurement
error is related to product type in that homogenous goods are more likely to have short
gaps, then our results will misrepresent the role of product type.
To check the sensitivity of our results, we considered three alternative approaches toward
the issue of multiple spells. First, we assume that a one-year gap between spells is an error
and merge the individual spells and adjust the duration length accordingly. Gaps of two or
more years are assumed to be accurate and no merging is done. As an example, suppose
the US imports a product from country c in 1973-74, 1976-77, and 1979-80. Without any
adjustment this trade pattern is interpreted as three distinct spells, each of length two years.
If we assume that all gaps of one year are errors, we would instead observe just one distinct
spell with a length of eight years.
The survival functions for the 7-digit TS and the 5-digit SITC data using the gap-
adjusted data are shown in the lower right panels of Figures 1 and 2, respectively. The
probability of survival for each product type increases at each point in time, yet the diﬀer-
ences across product types remain. The same can be inferred from the estimation results
reported in Table 1. We ﬁnd that the impact of product type increases slightly as compared
with our benchmark runs. Reference priced goods have an 18 percent higher hazard rate
while homogeneous goods have a 19 percent higher hazard rate than diﬀerentiated goods.
Interestingly, in the more ﬂexible speciﬁcation (Table 2) we ﬁnd evidence that product type
may not matter. In particular, the point estimate indicates a higher hazard for homogenous
goods, but the estimate is insigniﬁcant.16
16The point estimate for reference priced goods is lower. Given our sample size, it is reasonable to interpret
this as not statistically signiﬁcant.
16Our second approach toward this potential measurement error issue involved limiting
the analysis to only ﬁrst spells of relationships. This alternative restricts the sample to
those relationships with just a single spell and also to the ﬁrst spell of those relationships
with multiple service spells. Here we are implicitly saying that our use of a dummy to
control for the impact of multiple spells may be insuﬃcient. As seen in column ﬁve of
Table 1, the results are qualitatively similar to the gap-adjusted approach. That is, we ﬁnd
large diﬀerences between product types with homogenous goods facing the largest hazard
followed by reference priced goods.
The third approach is more restrictive than the second. Here we addressed the mea-
surement error issue by limiting the analysis to just single spell relationships. Thus, we
drop not only the second or higher spell, but all spells of service for trade relationships with
multiple spells. As seen in the sixth column of Table 1 the results are very similar to the
ﬁrst spell only speciﬁcation.
5.4 Inability to observe starting dates prior to 1972
The next possible concern involves the fact that we do not observe the true starting date for
those spells that were active in 1972. As mentioned, this limitation aﬄicts about 10 percent
of observed spells. Consider a relationship that is observed in 1972 and is observed for x
years. We believe that the most appropriate interpretation is that this relationship had
ad u r a t i o no fa tl e a s tx years, which in practice means that all such spells are treated as
censored. Our concern is that our interpretation may bias the estimation since at least some
of the spells were already long-lived in 1972.
The most straightforward approach to get a sense of the potential bias from this cen-
soring issue is to limit our analysis to only those spells that begin after 1972. From 1973
onwards, we observe when a spell starts. The Cox proportional hazard estimates are re-
ported in the last column of Table 1. As we saw with the other robustness tests, the product
type estimates are not reduced and in fact are somewhat larger than in our benchmark esti-
mates: reference priced (homogeneous) goods have an 18 percent (25 percent) higher hazard
rate than diﬀerentiated goods.
5.5 Industry eﬀects
The ﬁnal concern we would like to investigate is whether the distribution of product types
across industries drives the results. A vast majority of products in our data set are clas-
siﬁed as diﬀerentiated, while fairly few are classiﬁed as homogeneous. Furthermore, two
industries, Machinery (SITC=7) and Miscellaneous Manufactures (SITC=8), are composed
entirely of diﬀerentiated goods.17 Could the driving force between our results be the dis-
17A third industry, SITC=9, is composed of diﬀerentiated and homogenous goods only and is not presented.
17tribution of product types across industries? That is, are the preceding results found when
looking at individual industries or is it driven by variation across industry?
To investigate we re-estimated our basic speciﬁcation for each 1-digit industry sepa-
rately.18 We chose this approach rather than simply including industry dummies because
the majority of products are in two industries (SITC=7 and 8) and these two industries
happen to contain only diﬀerentiated products. This hinders our inability to separately
identify industry and product type eﬀects.
The results are reported in Table 5. In the interest of brevity, we only report the
estimates for the product type dummies. In the top panel we report estimates for the
benchmark 7-digit data. In the lower two panels we report estimates when relationships are
deﬁned using the SITC industry data. In the table we report estimates for all industries
where we observe trade relationships for all three product types.19
The results largely conﬁrm our ﬁndings—for ﬁve of six industries diﬀerentiated goods
tend to have lower hazard rates and involve longer-lived spells. There are, however, two
important caveats. First, for two of the industries the diﬀerence among product types is
not statistically signiﬁcant. The two exceptions are “Beverages and Tobacco” (SITC=1)
and “Animals and vegetable oils” (SITC=4). Not only do we observe fairly few trade
relationships for these two industries but in addition our sense is that the products in these
two industries may not be diﬀerentiated in an economically important way. Second, we ﬁnd
that diﬀerentiated products have a lower hazard rate than reference priced or homogeneous
goods for one industry “Mineral Fuels” (SITC=3). We are not troubled by this result
because (i) we do not know what it means for a mineral fuel to be diﬀerentiated and (ii) in
this industry being diﬀerentiated may be undesirable.
All in all, these ﬁndings conﬁrm that our main result—the diﬀerence across product
types—is not driven by the distribution of product types across industries.
6 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to investigate whether duration of trade relationships
depends on the nature of the product being traded and whether any diﬀerences are system-
atic. The results presented indicate that indeed duration of trade depends on the type of
the product being traded. Diﬀerentiated products have a median duration years longer than
either reference priced or homogeneous goods. The hazard rate for diﬀerentiated products
is lower than for reference priced products, which in turn is lower than for homogenous
products
18We continue to deﬁne trade relationships at a more disaggregated level (7-digit TS, 5- and 4-digit SITC).
19At the 7-digit TS level there are no results for “Beverages and Tobacco” (SITC=1) as missing values in
the explanatory variables preclude identifying all three product types at this level of disaggregation.
18We perform a large number of robustness exercises which show that diﬀerences in du-
ration across product types are systematic. Our results also indicate that shorter distance,
common language, common border, higher GDP, higher tariﬀs, and depreciation of the
source country’s currency all lead to longer durations. Higher variation in unit values,
lower relative unit values, and higher market share all lead to lower hazard.
We based our analysis on Rauch’s (1999) classiﬁcation of products. One of the features
of this classiﬁcation is that about 80 percent of our products are deemed to be diﬀerentiated.
While we have shown that such a dominance of diﬀerentiated goods is not driving our results,
we wonder whether a ﬁner delineation within the diﬀerentiated goods category would shed
more light on the extent that diﬀerentiation matters. In future research we hope to reﬁne
the Rauch classiﬁcation so as to address this question. We reiterate, however, that Rauch’s
classiﬁcation is the best currently available, and the development of a new one would involve
signiﬁcant time and expense.
Our analysis indicates that the survival in US import markets will be longer if a diﬀer-
entiated good is traded. An open question that we did not seek to answer in this paper
is whether exporters should focus on diﬀerentiated goods. In other words, future work
could study whether a country’s development experience is related to its movement from
homogenous to diﬀerentiated products.
Furthermore, we also would like to investigate what is the driving force behind the
diﬀerences among products illuminated in this paper. The question of whether they are
a reﬂection of consumer preferences, network issues, production, technology, or ﬁxed costs
associated with exporting are all important questions that should be addressed in future
work.
References
[1] Baldwin, Richard, “Hysteresis in Import Prices: The Beachhead Eﬀect,” American
Economic Review, 78 (1988), 773–785.
[2] Besedeˇ s Tibor and Thomas J. Prusa, “On the Duration of Trade,” (2003), NBER
Working Paper No. 9936.
[3] Dixit, A.K. and J. Stiglitz, “Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity,”
American Economic Review 67 (1977), 297–308.
[4] Casella, Alessandra and James Rauch, “Overcoming Informational Barriers to Inter-
national Resource Allocation: Prices and Ties,” Economic Journal, 113 (2003), 21–42.
[5] Dalgin, Muhammed, Devashish Mitra and Vitor Trindade, “Inequality, Nonhomothetic
Preferences, and Trade: a Gravity Approach,” (2003), mimeo.
19[6] Debaere, Peter, “Relative factor abundance and trade,” Journal of Political Economy,
111 (2003), 589–610.
[7] Evenett, Simon and Wolfgang Keller, “On Theories Explaining the Success of the
Gravity Equation,” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002), 281–316.
[8] Feenstra, Robert C., “US Imports, 1972–1994: Data and Concordances,” (1996),
NBER Working Paper 5515.
[9] Krugman, Paul R., “Scale economies, product diﬀerentiation, and the pattern of trade,”
American Economic Review 70 (1980) 950–59.
[10] Helpman, Elhanan, “Imperfect competition and international trade: Evidence from
Fourteen Industrial Countries,” Journal of Japanese and International Economies 1
(1987), 62–81.
[11] Helpman, Elhanan and Paul R. Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade. (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1985).
[12] Hummels, David and James Levinsohn, “Monopolistic competition and international
trade: Reinterpreting the evidence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 799–
836.
[13] Melitz, Marc, “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity,” Econometrica LXXI (2003), 1695–1725.
[14] Neary, J.P., “Monopolistic competition and international trade theory,” (2000), pa-
per prepared for the conference on “The Monopolistic Competition Revolution after
Twenty-Five Year.”
[15] Rauch, James, “Trade and Search: Social Capital, Sogo Shosha, and Spillovers,”
(1996), NBER Working Paper 5618.
[16] Rauch, James, “Networks versus Markets in International Trade,” Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 48 (1999), 7–35.
[17] Rauch, James, “Business and Social Networks in International Trade,” Journal of
Economic Literature 39 (2001), 1177–1203.
[18] Rauch, James and Vitor Trindade, “Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade,”
Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (2002), 116–130.
[19] Salop, Steven, “Monopolistic competition with outside goods,” Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 10 (1979), 141–56.
[20] Schott, Peter K. “Do Countries Specialize?,” (2001), NBER Working Paper No. 8492.
20A Data Appendix
All of the data used in this paper are available from public sources.
Variable Source
7-digit TS import data Robert Feenstra’s online data collection at
http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/
5- and 4-digit SITC
import data
http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/
GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank Statistics)
Consumer Price Index Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
Language, Contiguity,
Distance
Jon Haveman’s online international trade data at
http://www.haveman.org/
US Industry level Tar-
iﬀs
Chris Magee calculated tariﬀ rates; available at
http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/






Calculated from 7-digit TS import data from
http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/
B Sketch of models supporting the empirics
In this appendix we use standard models of imperfect competition to gain insight about how
the duration of suppliers is aﬀected by the extent of product substitutability. We show that
exit is more likely in homogenous product markets than in diﬀerentiated product markets.
We begin with oligopoly models that take ﬁrms’ geographical locations as exogenous and
emphasize the strategic interaction among these ﬁrms (address models). In these models
transportation costs (distance) play a key role in diﬀerentiating the products. In addition,
the strategic interaction among ﬁrms can result in ﬁrms exiting the market. These models
imply the greater is the diﬀerentiation between products, the less sensitive are the supplying
ﬁrms to changes in costs and tariﬀs.
We also use a standard model of trade with increasing returns and monopolistic compe-
tition (a nonaddress model). This model utilizes Dixit-Stiglitz preferences thereby abstract-
ing from strategic issues but nevertheless allowing us to identify the equilibrium number of
ﬁrms in the market and to show that changes in costs have a greater impact on homogenous
product industries than in diﬀerentiated product industries.
21B.1 Spatial Competition
Begin by considering a version of Hotelling’s linear city model applied to trade. In our
application we assume that domestic consumers of mass N are uniformly distributed along
the z ∈ [0,1] interval. A foreign ﬁrm is located at each endpoint with ﬁrm A located at the
left endpoint. Given the nature of our dataset, it is convenient to think of each ﬁrm being
located in a diﬀerent foreign country.20 Hence, domestic consumers can import the product
from either country A or B.
In models of spatial competition, transportation costs serve to diﬀerentiate the products.
For simplicity we will assume that transportation cost are linear in distance shipped.21
Letting d denote the marginal cost of shipping the product, it follows that the products are
less substitutable the larger is d.
The products are produced with constant marginal cost, cj > 0, j = A,B. Every
consumer wants at most one unit and derives a gross beneﬁt of v from its consumption. For
a consumer located a distance x from ﬁrm j the total cost of buying is tjpj + dx, where tj
is one plus the ad valorem tariﬀ. Without loss of generality let ﬁrm A have lower eﬀective
costs, i.e., tAcA ≤ tBcB.
Assuming that all consumers obtain strictly positive surplus by purchasing the good
from one of the two countries, one can show that the location of the consumer indiﬀerent
between the two ﬁrms is
(B.1) z =
3d + tBcB − tAcA
6d
.
When the ﬁrms are symmetric (tBcB = tAcA) z =1 /2 and each ﬁrm supplies half of
the market. For a given value of d ﬁrm B’s sales decrease as its tariﬀ or its costs increase.
In other words, ﬁrm B loses market share as it becomes less competitive. Similarly, for a
given value of d ﬁrm B’s sales decrease as ﬁrm A’s tariﬀ or costs decrease. In other words,
ﬁrm B loses market share as it’s rival becomes more competitive. In addition, note that
the larger is d the smaller is the impact of a given change in costs or tariﬀs. Put another
way, tariﬀ and cost changes have a smaller impact on each ﬁrms’s sales the greater is the
product diﬀerentiation.
Now, suppose that each ﬁrm must incur ﬁxed costs of production, fj ≥ 0, to produce
the good. As a result ﬁrm B will not service the domestic market if
tBcB >t AcA +3 d − (18fBd)1/2.
20While our data is extremely disaggregated at the product-level, we only observe the source country of
imports. The identity of the speciﬁc ﬁrm selling the product is not reported.
21It easy to demonstrate that a model with quadratic transportation costs yields similar results.
22Clearly, if cB (or tB) become suﬃciently large, ﬁrm B will exit the market. Empirically,
this means that we might observe ﬁrm B active in the market for a period of time and then,
after a cost change, exit the market. Note that the greater the product diﬀerentiation,
the greater the increase in costs before we will observe ﬁrm B exiting the market. Taken
together these comparative static results suggest that we should ﬁnd that ﬁrms competing
in diﬀerentiated product industries are less sensitive to tariﬀ and cost changes and hence
will experience less exit.
These insights can be extended to the case when there are more than two ﬁrms using
the model of Salop (1979). In this case it is assumed that consumers are located uniformly
on a circle with perimeter 1 and where N ﬁrms could potentially service the market. Once
again we think of each ﬁrm as a foreign ﬁrm/country supplying the domestic market, where
diﬀerent consumers prefer to source their imports from diﬀerent countries.
In the Salop model one can show that the greater is the product diﬀerentiation the
greater is the proﬁt margin. As was the case in the two-ﬁrm linear model, this suggests
that we should observe less exit in product markets with greater product diﬀerentiation.
B.2 Monopolistic Competition
A standard model of trade with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition
can also be used to gain insight about how the length of trading relationships varies with
the elasticity of substitution.
Let there be N countries and M sectors, where each sector has a large number of product
varieties, nm <N. For simplicity (and for consistency with our data), we will assume each
country produces only one variety and so we will associate countries with varieties. Domestic






where γm is the share of expenditures on sector m and Qm is a composite of symmetric











,σ m > 1,
where we have assumed the subutility function has the CES form. The parameter σ is the
elasticity of substitution between varieties. The smaller is σ the greater is the extent of
product diﬀerentiation (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977).




We allow for iceberg transport costs in shipping goods between countries and for import
tariﬀs, so the consumer’s price is Pi = piτidi, where pi is the price the foreign ﬁrm earns, τi
is one plus the ad valorem tariﬀ and di is transportation costs.
Each producer (country) i is identiﬁed by a good i. The production of a diﬀerentiated
good i involves a ﬁxed cost fm and a constant marginal cost cm. Because of the ﬁxed costs
the number of diﬀerentiated goods actually being consumed is far less than the number of
potential diﬀerentiated goods, nm <N. As is usually done, we will assume that nm is large
and that free entry guarantees zero proﬁts.
If we assume symmetry and solve three conditions simultaneously (proﬁt maximization,
zero proﬁts, and utility maximization) we can solve for the equilibrium,
pm = cmσm/(σm − 1), (B.2)
xm =( σm − 1)fm/cm, (B.3)
nm = γmI/(τmdmfmσm) (B.4)
As has been noted elsewhere (Neary, 2000), the price and quantity are functions of
costs and the elasticity of substitution. Changes in other parameters (e.g., tariﬀs and
transportation costs) lead to adjustments in the number of foreign ﬁrms (countries) only.
Now consider two industries where products in industry j are more diﬀerentiated than
those in industry i, σj <σ i. From (B.4) it follows that industry i is more sensitive to
changes in tariﬀs, transportation costs, and ﬁxed costs. Therefore, we expect changes in
these variables to lead to more exit in homogenous good industries than in diﬀerentiated
product industries.22
22The substitution parameter also plays a key role in Melitz’s (2003) model with heterogenous ﬁrms.
While Melitz’s primary interest is how domestic ﬁrms respond to trade, his model implies that changes in
tariﬀs, transportation costs, and ﬁxed costs have greater impact in homogenous good industries than in
diﬀerentiated product industries.




































Figure 1 - Survival Function for Rauch's Product Classification

































































































































































































































5-digit SITC rev. 2
Figure 2 - Survival Function for Rauch's Product Classification


































Figure 3 - Distribution of Spell Lengths
All observations
Weighed by 1st year trade value
Observations with trade value > $100,000
Observations with trade value > $1,000,000Table 1: TS7 Benchmark and Robustness
 
Benchmark Obs>$100,000 Obs>$1,000,000 Gap-adjusted First spell only
Single spell 
relationships No 1972 spells
Distance 1.00819 1.01383 1.01765 1.01116 1.01388 1.02042 1.00559
(unit = 1,000 kilometers) (0.000) (0.005) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Language Dummy  0.94650 0.75806 0.72536 0.93629 0.90335 0.90590 0.96720
(=1 if English) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contiguous with USA 0.71997 0.52327 0.43649 0.64441 0.64858 0.53858 0.74299
(=1 if share border with USA) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.98020 0.96393 0.96913 0.97438 0.97082 0.96421 0.98005
(unit = $100 billion) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 digit SIC tariff rate 0.98160 0.94699 0.88849 0.97961 0.97745 0.97633 0.98127
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percentage change in relative real exchange rate  0.90263 0.90318 0.94450 0.87347 0.92725 0.88464 0.90154
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient of variation of unit values 0.92058 0.86905 0.91679 0.91211 0.92138 0.88997 0.90007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative unit values  1.00423 1.00862 1.01140 1.05000 1.00518 1.00571 1.00410
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country-product market share  0.99823 0.99656 0.99045 0.87641 0.99810 0.99962 0.99919
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) for spell >= 2 1.70209 2.91827 3.14798 1.72615 1.44327
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) reference priced 1.16100 1.50266 2.53224 1.18204 1.25144 1.22272 1.18509
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) homogeneous goods 1.18098 1.62029 2.83880 1.19078 1.31844 1.30567 1.25349
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 982,418 315,278 117,278 982,418 759,336 631,006 783,364
No. Subjects 365,808 68,217 20,912 314,673 266,251 200,076 333,320
Est. LogL -1,912,610 -125,443 -17,152 -1,384,010 -1,156,250 -709,864 -1,897,040
p values in parentheses
Region Dummies included but not reportedTable 2: TS7 Benchmark and Robustness -- Product Type Estimates
 
Benchmark Obs>$100,000 Obs>$1,000,000 Gap-adjusted First spell only
Single spell 
relationships No 1972 spells
Distance 1.00635 1.00353 0.96505 1.00887 1.01192 1.01688 1.00328
(unit = 1,000 kilometers) (0.000) (0.551) (0.084) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020)
Language Dummy  0.94944 0.76278 0.64723 0.94322 0.90949 0.91436 0.96783
(=1 if English) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contiguous with USA 0.70603 0.49861 0.45841 0.62755 0.63792 0.52648 0.72378
(=1 if share border with USA) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.97600 0.95465 0.95843 0.96920 0.96549 0.96135 0.97598
(unit = $100 billion) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 digit SIC tariff rate 0.98128 0.94558 0.88681 0.97923 0.97674 0.97553 0.98128
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percentage change in relative real exchange rate  0.89539 0.89495 0.98382 0.86799 0.91554 0.87490 0.89501
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.626) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient of variation of unit values 0.89383 0.77488 0.72670 0.88085 0.88256 0.85068 0.87696
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative unit values  1.00423 1.00956 1.01268 1.05033 1.00527 1.00585 1.00408
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country-product market share  0.99858 0.99710 0.99390 0.92216 0.99851 1.00006 0.99944
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.001)
Dummy (=1) for spell >= 2 1.80832 4.01020 9.28593 1.84561 1.56169
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance 1.01846 1.02746 1.01959 1.02329 1.02622 1.03820 1.01711
(unit = 1,000 kilometers) (0.000) (0.000) (0.233) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Language Dummy  0.94557 0.80247 0.75711 0.92430 0.89003 0.87859 0.97110
(=1 if English) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053)
Contiguous with USA 0.79329 0.54445 0.33448 0.73211 0.72607 0.63123 0.83288
(=1 if share border with USA) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.98848 0.96737 0.95526 0.98407 0.98239 0.97007 0.98837
(unit = $100 billion) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 digit SIC tariff rate 0.98058 0.95929 0.89675 0.97734 0.97238 0.97368 0.97890
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percentage change in relative real exchange rate  0.92726 0.90651 0.91287 0.89279 0.97789 0.93458 0.92163
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient of variation of unit values 1.00347 0.98935 1.01335 1.00787 1.04802 1.02881 0.96965
(0.627) (0.570) (0.757) (0.344) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000)
Relative unit values  1.00435 1.00549 1.00222 1.05300 1.00526 1.00591 1.00428
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.609) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country-product market share  0.99802 0.99611 0.98919 0.83735 0.99786 0.99889 0.99904
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) for spell >= 2 1.42979 2.26204 2.85765 1.45127 1.16617
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance 1.00845 1.01681 1.01598 1.01398 1.01492 1.02840 1.00638
(unit = 1,000 kilometers) (0.040) (0.035) (0.225) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000) (0.119)
Language Dummy  0.87592 0.70691 0.83665 0.83619 0.80976 0.78269 0.93198
(=1 if English) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030)
Contiguous with USA 0.71100 0.53033 0.39045 0.62641 0.61020 0.45643 0.77558
(=1 if share border with USA) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 1.00072 1.00035 1.00830 1.00036 1.00242 0.99577 1.00041
(unit = $100 billion) (0.689) (0.931) (0.217) (0.868) (0.385) (0.339) (0.819)
4 digit SIC tariff rate 0.98767 0.93991 0.91005 0.98490 0.98366 0.97911 0.98440
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percentage change in relative real exchange rate  0.92768 0.92305 0.94554 0.89169 0.95107 0.90947 0.92889
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient of variation of unit values 1.08638 1.17029 1.14651 1.11388 1.16430 1.16914 1.04500
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)
Relative unit values  1.00308 1.01152 1.01081 1.02787 1.00412 1.00342 1.00308
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.011) (0.005) (0.078) (0.001)
Country-product market share  0.99722 0.99548 0.98677 0.77237 0.99593 0.99592 0.99957
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.523)
Dummy (=1) for spell >= 2 1.21852 1.45754 1.55374 1.24762 0.91961
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Dummy (=1) reference priced 0.98419 1.11509 1.88295 0.93935 0.91780 0.85553 1.03732
(0.504) (0.135) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004) (0.000) (0.127)
Dummy (=1) homogeneous goods 1.11119 1.54068 2.33298 1.01436 0.96978 0.93645 1.25702
(0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.772) (0.583) (0.384) (0.000)
Observations 982,418 315,278 117,278 982,418 759,336 631,006 783,364
No. Subjects 365,808 68,217 20,912 314,673 266,251 200,076 333,320
Est. LogL -1,912,080 -125,108 -16,988 -1,383,550 -1,155,860 -709,628 -1,896,390
p values in parentheses









































sTable 3: SITC Industry Analysis
Benchmark (TS7) SITC5 SITC4
Distance 1.00819 1.00766 1.00146
(unit = 1,000 kilometers) (0.000) (0.000) (0.518)
Language Dummy  0.94650 0.95391 0.95196
(=1 if English) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contiguous with USA 0.71997 0.48881 0.38268
(=1 if share border with USA) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.98020 0.96861 0.95578
(unit = $100 billion) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 digit SIC tariff rate 0.98160
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000)
Percentage change in relative real exchange rate  0.90263 0.95772 0.96517
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient of variation of unit values 0.92058
(0.000)
Relative unit values  1.00423
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000)
Country-product market share  0.99823
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) for spell >= 2 1.70209 1.29094 1.34945
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) reference priced 1.16100 1.23962 1.19855
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) homogeneous goods 1.18098 1.31709 1.36802
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 982,418 499,675 319,141
No. Subjects 365,808 116,009 67,149
Est. LogL -1,912,610 -774,805 -407,848
Region Dummies included but not reportedTable 4: SITC Industry - Product Type Estimates
Benchmark (TS7) SITC5 SITC4
Distance 1.00635 1.00845 1.00255
(unit = 1,000 kilometers) (0.000) (0.000) (0.299)
Language Dummy  0.94944 0.95288 0.94069
(=1 if English) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contiguous with USA 0.70603 0.46495 0.35228
(=1 if share border with USA) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.97600 0.93482 0.90265
(unit = $100 billion) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 digit SIC tariff rate 0.98128
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000)
Percentage change in relative real exchange rate  0.89539 0.96982 0.97928
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient of variation of unit values 0.89383
(0.000)
Relative unit values  1.00423
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000)
Country-product market share  0.99858
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) for spell >= 2 1.80832 1.31226 1.36489
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance 1.01846 1.01268 1.00824
(unit = 1,000 kilometers) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)
Language Dummy  0.94557 0.95988 0.97124
(=1 if English) (0.000) (0.038) (0.254)
Contiguous with USA 0.79329 0.55822 0.43667
(=1 if share border with USA) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.98848 0.98564 0.97298
(unit = $100 billion) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 digit SIC tariff rate 0.98058
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000)
Percentage change in relative real exchange rate  0.92726 0.93162 0.93502
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient of variation of unit values 1.00347
(0.627)
Relative unit values  1.00435
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000)
Country-product market share  0.99802
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) for spell >= 2 1.42979 1.21389 1.27996
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance 1.00845 1.00599 1.00071
(unit = 1,000 kilometers) (0.040) (0.175) (0.893)
Language Dummy  0.87592 0.94335 0.95753
(=1 if English) (0.000) (0.105) (0.313)
Contiguous with USA 0.71100 0.56005 0.51471
(=1 if share border with USA) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 1.00072 0.99927 0.99743
(unit = $100 billion) (0.689) (0.741) (0.386)
4 digit SIC tariff rate 0.98767
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000)
Percentage change in relative real exchange rate  0.92768 0.91653 0.91903
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient of variation of unit values 1.08638
(0.000)
Relative unit values  1.00308
(unit = 10 percentage points) (0.000)
Country-product market share  0.99722
(unit = 1 percentage point) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) for spell >= 2 1.21852 1.21978 1.30011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) reference priced 0.98419 1.12351 1.06722
(0.504) (0.000) (0.050)
Dummy (=1) homogeneous goods 1.11119 1.21651 1.20794
(0.014) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 982,418 499,675 319,141
No. Subjects 365,808 116,009 67,149
Est. LogL -1,912,080 -774,420 -407,576
p values in parentheses









































sTable 5: Product Type Effect (within each 1 digit industry)
TS7 Data SITC=0 SITC=1 SITC=2 SITC=3 SITC=4 SITC=5 SITC=6
Dummy (=1) reference priced 1.15724 0.99029 0.81701 1.01956 1.15638 1.02592
(0.000) (0.782) (0.038) (0.874) (0.000) (0.015)
Dummy (=1) homogeneous goods 1.12250 1.23185 0.77275 1.11415 1.24701 1.21653
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.249) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 60,668 17,898 6,060 4,310 72,688 336,430
No. Subjects 20,654 7,001 2,193 1,728 23,399 125,307
SITC5 Data SITC=0 SITC=1 SITC=2 SITC=3 SITC=4 SITC=5 SITC=6
Dummy (=1) reference priced 1.18885 0.93920 1.18070 0.83029 1.17367 1.23992 1.14980
(0.000) (0.472) (0.000) (0.025) (0.260) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) homogeneous goods 1.28220 1.06183 1.26161 0.64195 1.16755 1.53650 1.28076
(0.000) (0.589) (0.000) (0.000) (0.169) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 45,600 6,549 36,204 5,245 3,263 46,361 137,756
No. Subjects 11,469 1,446 10,170 1,624 1,089 11,509 31,276
SITC4 Data SITC=0 SITC=1 SITC=2 SITC=3 SITC=4 SITC=5 SITC=6
Dummy (=1) reference priced 1.06292 0.99323 1.23944 0.79860 1.07511 1.21607 1.13399
(0.106) (0.947) (0.000) (0.013) (0.628) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (=1) homogeneous goods 1.22083 1.17009 1.38782 0.61029 1.11979 1.36894 1.27158
(0.000) (0.198) (0.000) (0.000) (0.294) (0.022) (0.000)
Observations 34,568 5,748 25,955 4,621 3,098 30,453 86,289
No. Subjects 7,604 1,189 6,800 1,385 984 6,476 17,475
Full specification results available upon request